The Roles that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play in Determining Management Forecast Precision by CHOI, Jong-Hag et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy 
6-2010 
The Roles that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play in 
Determining Management Forecast Precision 
Jong-Hag CHOI 
Seoul National University 
Linda A. MYERS 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Yoonseok ZANG 
Singapore Management University, yszang@smu.edu.sg 
David A. ZIEBART 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial 
Management Commons 
Citation 
CHOI, Jong-Hag; MYERS, Linda A.; ZANG, Yoonseok; and ZIEBART, David A.. The Roles that Forecast 
Surprise and Forecast Error Play in Determining Management Forecast Precision. (2010). Accounting 
Horizons. 24, (2), 165-188. Research Collection School Of Accountancy. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/147 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of 
Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For 
more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
 
 
 
The Roles that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play  
in Determining Management Forecast Precision 
 
 
 
 
Jong-Hag Choi 
College of Business Administration 
Seoul National University 
acchoi@snu.ac.kr 
 
Linda A. Myers 
Walton College of Business 
University of Arkansas 
lmyers@walton.uark.edu 
 
Yoonseok Zang 
School of Accountancy 
Singapore Management University 
yszang@smu.edu.sg 
 
David A. Ziebart 
Gatton College of Business and Economics 
University of Kentucky 
dzieb2@email.uky.edu 
 
 
 
 
October 2009 (Forthcoming at Accounting Horizons) 
 
Keywords: management forecasts; management forecast precision; management forecast 
surprise; management forecast error 
 
Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper 
 
We appreciate helpful comments from Sun-Hwa Choi, Gary Giroux, Jay Junghun Lee, Woojong Lee, Clive Lennox, 
James Myers, Chul Park, Jeffrey Pittman, participants at the 2006 Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology – Singapore Management University – Seoul National University joint research camp, the 2006 Korean 
Accounting Association annual conference, and the 2007 AAA meeting, and seminar participants at Texas A&M 
University. Jong-Hag Choi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Samil PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Faculty Fellowship. Linda Myers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Garrison/Wilson Chair at the 
University of Arkansas and from the PricewaterhouseCoopers Faculty Fellowship while at Texas A&M University. 
The Roles that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play  
in Determining Management Forecast Precision 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
Studying the determinants of management forecast precision is important because a better 
understanding of the factors affecting management’s choice of forecast precision can provide 
investors and other users with cues about the characteristics of the information contained in the 
forecasts. In addition, as regulators assess the regulation of voluntary management disclosures, 
they need to better understand how managers choose among forecast precision disclosure 
alternatives. Using 16,872 management earnings forecasts collected from 1995 through 2004, we 
provide strong evidence that forecast precision is negatively associated with the magnitude of the 
forecast surprise and that this negative association is stronger when the forecast is bad news than 
when it is good news. We also find that forecast precision is negatively associated with the 
absolute magnitude of the forecast error that proxies for the forecast uncertainty that managers 
face when they issue forecasts, and that the negative association is stronger when forecast errors 
are negative. These results are consistent with greater liability concerns related to bad news 
forecasts and negative forecast errors, respectively. Our study provides educators and researchers 
with important insights into management’s choice of earnings forecast precision, which is a 
component of the voluntary disclosure process that is not well understood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In this study, we extend prior research on the determinants of the precision of 
management forecasts by examining the association between management forecast precision and 
the forecast surprise, and between management forecast precision and the forecast error. The 
forecast surprise can be thought of as the amount (i.e., the sign and magnitude) of the “news” in 
the management forecast, and the forecast error can be thought of as a measure of management’s 
uncertainty regarding the future earnings realization.  
The practice of earnings guidance, and in particular the issuance of management forecasts 
of earnings, has grown significantly since the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
was passed by Congress in 1995.1 Although policy makers provided the “Safe Harbor Rule” in 
1979 and the PSLRA in 1995 to protect managers and to induce them to release more forward-
looking information (Hirst et al. 2008), evidence suggests that litigation concerns affect 
management disclosure choices (Baginski et al. 2002). At the time this legislation was adopted, 
the primary goal of policy makers was to increase broad disclosures of forward-looking 
information. In addition, forecast precision and accuracy were expected to improve as managers 
gained experience with providing forward-looking information. Moreover, as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Committee move to 
more principles-based standards, there is an expectation that firms will provide more transparent 
disclosures. 
Even with these changes, managers can be expected to act strategically to enhance their 
reputations and to minimize perceived litigation risk. Thus, to promote more precise disclosures 
in the United States, policy makers should consider the effect of management incentives on 
management’s choice of forecast precision. Moreover, although some forecasts are imprecise, 
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allowing managers to select their forecast precision can help them to convey their level of 
uncertainty regarding future earnings realizations. 
Given that management forecasts of earnings have important consequences,2 
understanding managers’ choices regarding forecast attributes is important for investors, 
regulators, and educators. Baginski et al. (2004) point out that the incentives that cause managers 
to choose among various forecast characteristics have not been extensively studied, and Hirst et 
al. (2008, 2) state that “given that managers have substantially greater control over forecast 
characteristics than they have over forecast antecedents and consequences, it is striking that the 
decisions managers make about such characteristics are comparatively less understood.” 
Understanding management’s choice of forecast precision is important because the choice of 
precision can provide investors and other users with cues about the characteristics of the 
information contained in the forecasts. Moreover, understanding the determinants of forecast 
precision should allow regulators to better evaluate policies related to voluntary management 
disclosures. Finally, as Hirst et al. (2008, 2) point out, “gaining a better understanding of the 
choices that managers make once they decide to issue an earnings forecast is an important 
direction for both theory development and empirical research.” Although we are not able to 
observe the decision process underlying the choice of precision, we can empirically examine 
some of the tradeoffs that likely underlie management’s choice of forecast precision to gain a 
better understanding of how management chooses forecast precision. This has implications for 
other voluntary disclosures where managers can exercise significant discretion in the choice of 
disclosure characteristics.  
A small body of the extant accounting literature investigates the determinants of 
management forecast precision. Although this literature documents that forecast precision varies 
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as expected with the amount of private information (as proxied by analyst following) and public 
information (as proxied by firm size) (Baginski and Hassell 1997), with product market 
concentration and forecast venue (Bamber and Cheon 1998), and with forecast horizon (Baginski 
and Hassell 1997; Bamber and Cheon 1998), prior studies are unable to document an association 
between the sign of the forecast surprise and forecast precision.3 Note that this prior research 
focuses on the difference in forecast precision between good and bad news forecasts, but does 
not consider the magnitude of the news in the forecast (i.e., the forecast surprise). Furthermore, 
these studies examine relatively small samples of hand-collected forecasts (and thus have low 
power) that were made during an earlier period (i.e., the 1980s) when management concerns 
regarding litigation were likely different from those in more recent periods.  
 We extend prior studies on forecast precision by focusing on the roles of forecast surprise 
and forecast uncertainty. We define forecast precision as whether forecasts are point estimates, 
ranges, minimums or maximums, or qualitative statements. We measure forecast surprise as the 
absolute value of the difference between management’s earnings forecast and the consensus 
analyst forecast or as the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns at the management 
forecast date. We use the forecast error, which we measure as the absolute value of the difference 
between management’s earnings forecast and actual (ex post) earnings, to proxy for 
management’s uncertainty about the eventual earnings realization.4 
Both the forecast surprise and the forecast uncertainty should be important in 
management’s decision regarding forecast precision because both could be important in any 
potential litigation. For example, decisions to litigate by the plaintiffs bar would certainly be a 
function of the price reactions surrounding both the issuance of the forecast and the subsequent 
earnings realization. The magnitudes of the price reactions can be affected by the choice of 
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precision and management’s defence can appeal to “uncertainty” if the issued forecast has low 
precision. 
We expect managers to issue less-precise forecasts when their forecasts include more 
surprising news (e.g., when their earnings expectations are further from analysts’ current 
expectations), because the magnitude of the surprise will be less evident to investors when 
management forecasts are less precise. Similarly, we expect that managers will issue less-precise 
forecasts when they have greater uncertainty about future earnings realizations. Thus, we expect 
a negative association between forecast precision and forecast surprise, and a negative 
association between forecast precision and forecast error. Moreover, because we expect 
managers to be more concerned about a decrease in stock prices (and resultant legal liability) that 
results from the release of bad news or the release of news with negative signed forecast errors 
(Skinner 1994, 1997; Atiase et al. 2006),5 we expect that the negative association between 
forecast precision and forecast surprise and the negative association between forecast precision 
and the forecast error will be stronger for bad-news forecasts and for forecasts with negative 
signed forecast errors. Using a larger sample of more recent management earnings forecasts than 
used in prior work (i.e., 16,872 firm-year observations collected from the First Call database for 
the years 1995 through 2004), we perform extensive empirical analyses and find evidence 
consistent with our expectations. In addition, our inferences are invariant whether we conduct the 
analyses using our full sample of forecasts or using a restricted sample of only those forecasts 
with higher precision (i.e., point and range forecasts). Furthermore, our inferences are robust to 
whether we use a discrete or continuous variable for the level of forecast precision, and to 
different measures of the magnitude of the forecast surprise. These findings suggest that 
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managers act strategically when choosing the precision of their earnings forecasts, presumably to 
enhance their reputations and to minimize perceived litigation risk. 
 In the next section, we discuss the prior literature and present our hypotheses. We 
describe our methodology and models in the section that follows, and then present our empirical 
results. The final section concludes by summarizing our results and inferences. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
When issuing an earnings forecast, managers must choose the precision of the forecast 
(King et al. 1990). A point forecast (such as “earnings per share of $1.00”) provides the highest 
level of precision, while a range forecast (such as “earnings per share between $0.50 and $1.50”) 
provides the next level of precision. Although the midpoint of a range can be viewed as the most 
probable amount, interpreting a range forecast probably involves some weighting of the 
distribution. For example, a forecast with a relatively small range (such as “earnings per share 
between $0.90 and $1.10”) is likely viewed as being much more precise than is a forecast with a 
relatively greater range (such as “earnings per share between $0.50 and $1.50”). That is, 
although the midpoints of these two ranges are the same, the level of precision varies 
dramatically. Minimum forecasts (such as “earnings per share of at least $0.50”) or maximum 
forecasts (such as “earnings per share of at most $1.50”) are even less precise than are point or 
range forecasts. Finally, the least-precise form of forecast consists of qualitative statements such 
as “earnings will be better next year.” In our empirical analyses, we combine minimum and 
maximum forecasts with other qualitative statements because the distinction between 
minimum/maximum forecasts and qualitative statements requires coder judgment. For example, 
forecasts such as “we expect a loss” and “we may not meet expectations” can be interpreted as 
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either maximum forecasts or as qualitative statements. However, our results are qualitatively 
similar when we consider these categories separately. 
Following prior research (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Soffer et al. 2000; Field 
et al. 2005), we expect that managers have incentives to issue forecasts to reduce legal liability. 
That is, if managers do not disclose material information on a timely basis, investors could have 
a basis for lawsuits. However, the issuance of management forecasts, per se, does not necessarily 
decrease legal liability (Francis et al. 1994; Skinner 1997; Healy and Palepu 2001). Rather, the 
issuance of management forecasts could increase legal liability in two ways. First, if managers 
issue forecasts containing surprising news (i.e., with greater forecast surprise), investors can 
litigate on the basis that management failed to disclose material information on a more timely 
basis. Second, if the forecasted information turns out to be inaccurate (i.e., results in a greater 
forecast error), investors can litigate on the basis that management disclosed erroneous 
information.6 The first possibility is related to our Hypotheses 1 and 2, whereas the second 
possibility is related to our Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Given the potential legal consequences of issuing very surprising forecasts, we expect 
managers to issue less-precise forecasts when their forecasts include more surprising news (e.g., 
when their earnings expectations are further from analysts’ current expectations) because the 
magnitude of the surprise will be less evident to investors when management forecasts are less 
precise.7 More-precise forecasts could have a greater impact on stock prices (Baginski et al. 
1993; Libby et al. 2006; Han and Tan 2007), because the implications of precise forecasts are 
more readily discernable (Baginski et al. 1993).8 This potential for a differential response can 
give managers incentives to release more or less precise forecasts depending on their intentions 
(Titman and Trueman 1986; Hughes and Pae 2004). As a result, we expect that management’s 
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choice of forecast precision is systematically related to the forecast surprise. Specifically, we 
predict that managers have incentives to release less-precise forecasts when the forecast surprise 
is large to influence the magnitude of the market’s reaction and to avoid potential legal liability. 
This leads us to our first hypothesis (stated in the alternative form). 
H1: Forecast precision will be negatively related to the degree of forecast surprise. 
 Next, we expect the association between forecast precision and forecast surprise to be 
stronger for bad-news forecasts (i.e., when forecast surprise is negative, so that the forecasted 
earnings are smaller than the market’s expectation or the market’s reaction to the forecast 
disclosure is negative) than for good-news forecasts (i.e., when forecast surprise is positive). 
Prior studies find that bad news precipitates litigation more often than does good news (Skinner 
1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Field et al. 2005) or experience large negative returns (Alexander 
1992). Thus, managers should be more cautious in their choice of forecast precision when 
making bad-news forecasts (relative to when making good-news forecasts) as the magnitude of 
the forecast surprise increases because the likelihood of potential litigation is greater the worse 
the news. Consistent with this prediction, Graham et al. (2005, 65) report that “some CFOs admit 
that they do not mind ‘fuzziness’ in bad news disclosures.” Hughes and Pae (2004) also show 
that managers issue imprecise forecasts to dampen the adverse market reaction to bad news. 
Accordingly, we predict that bad-news forecasts will be less precise than good-news forecasts 
when the forecasts contain more surprising news. We test this prediction with our second 
hypothesis (stated in the alternative form). 
H2: The negative relationship between forecast precision and the degree of forecast 
surprise will be stronger for bad-news forecasts than for good-news forecasts. 
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As discussed earlier, litigation can also result when earnings realizations differ greatly 
from forecasted earnings. Consistent with this, Francis et al. (1994) report that 28 of 45 
litigations in their sample are because of misleading earnings forecasts or preemptive earnings 
disclosures. Because a lawsuit is costly to the firm even if the defendant prevails (Graham et al. 
2005), managers have incentives to attempt to avoid litigation by strategically choosing the level 
of forecast precision. One strategy for reducing the probability of litigation is to release only 
accurate information. Another strategy for reducing litigation exposure resulting from inaccurate 
news is to release imprecise information because the more imprecise the information, the less 
likely the forecast can be construed to be inaccurate. Thus, when managers are more uncertain 
about future earnings realizations, we expect them to issue less-precise forecasts.  
In general, a range forecast is less likely than a point forecast to be inaccurate (all else 
equal) because a range forecast contains more possible outcomes and is more likely to include 
the realization. Similarly, because a forecast with a larger range encompasses more possible 
outcomes, a larger range forecast is more likely to include the realization. Thus, because the 
probability that a forecast will turn out to be inaccurate increases as precision increases, 
management forecast precision can provide information about the degree of management’s 
confidence in the accuracy of their forecasts (King et al. 1990). However, managers do not know 
the future earnings realization with certainty, so they likely form expectations of future earnings, 
as well as expectations about the precision of their estimates. Therefore, we expect managers to 
issue more (less) precise forecasts when the forecast uncertainty is smaller (greater), and we 
posit that the realized (or ex post) magnitude of the forecast error is a suitable empirical proxy 
for this forecast uncertainty. Our hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, follows. 
H3: Forecast precision will be negatively related to the forecast error. 
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Recall that U.S. firms are more likely to be sued when they report large negative earnings 
surprises or experience large negative returns at the time of earnings announcements. Prior 
optimistic management forecasts could contribute to these negative earnings surprises or 
negative returns. Choi and Ziebart (2004) suggest that this asymmetric loss function induces 
managers to issue slightly less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts than they would in the 
absence of litigation concerns. Moreover, when managers face uncertainties in making their 
forecasts, they are likely to issue more imprecise forecasts because such forecasts are less likely 
to be inaccurate ex post. Given this, when managers perceive that the likelihood of negative 
forecast errors (i.e., forecasted earnings are greater than realized ex post earnings) is greater than 
the likelihood of positive forecast errors (i.e., forecasted earnings are smaller than realized ex 
post earnings), we predict that managers are more likely to issue imprecise forecasts to decrease 
their exposure to legal liability. We test this prediction with our fourth hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative form). 
H4: The negative relationship between forecast precision and forecast error will be 
stronger when forecast errors are negative than when they are positive. 
 
 In summary, we expect that forecast precision will be inversely related to the magnitude 
of the forecast surprise and to the magnitude of the absolute forecast error, and that the inverse 
relationships will be stronger for bad-news forecasts and for forecasts with negative errors, 
respectively.  
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METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Distributions 
 We obtain management forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) for the period 1995 
through 2004 from First Call. Our sample period begins in 1995 because management earnings 
forecasts became more prevalent with the passage of the PSLRA and because the First Call data 
became more comprehensive at this point (Anilowski et al. 2007). The First Call database 
includes both qualitative and quantitative management forecasts of earnings, and it has been 
widely used in the extant management forecast literature. This yielded 27,841 management 
forecast observations. To minimize possible confounding effects when multiple forecasts (i.e., 
forecasts for multiple fiscal periods) were made on the same date, we eliminated 5,764 
observations containing multiple forecasts.9 Because we need a measure of extant expectations to 
calculate the forecast surprise, and because we need actual earnings to calculate the subsequent 
earnings surprise, we removed an additional 3,053 forecasts with either no preceding analyst 
consensus forecast available for the corresponding fiscal year or no actual earnings in the First 
Call database.10 To remove forecasts that may have been erroneously added to the database after 
the actual earnings release, we further deleted 56 forecasts made more than 110 calendar days 
after fiscal year-end.11, 12 Finally, we removed forecasts for which we were unable to obtain the 
requisite data for our analyses on COMPUSTAT (1,582 observations) or CRSP (514 
observations). Our final sample comprises 16,872 management forecast observations made by 
2,735 firms. Table 1 summarizes our sample selection procedure. 
Insert <Table 1>  
 Descriptive statistics, by year and overall, regarding the number and percentage of 
sample observations with each type of forecast precision are provided in Table 2, Panel A. 
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Clearly, the number of management forecasts is increasing substantially over time, as is the 
number of each type of management forecast. Point and range forecasts are more common than 
are qualitative forecasts. Furthermore, the proportion of point forecasts is declining over time, 
from a high of 49.4 percent in 1995 to a low of 11.7 percent in 2004, while the proportion of 
range forecasts is generally increasing over time, from 42.1 percent in 1995 to 82.3 percent in 
2004 (with a low of 30 percent in 1997). This tendency could be related to the stringent 
disclosure-related legal liability that U.S. firms face. Interestingly, the proportion of qualitative 
forecasts increased from 8.5 percent in 1995 to a high of 36 percent in 1999, and then declined to 
6 percent in 2004. 
Insert < Table 2>  
Though not tabulated, we examine whether those firms making multiple forecasts during 
our sample period issue multiple types of forecasts with different precision. That is, we 
investigate whether the forecast type is “sticky.” We find that the number of forecast types 
increases as the number of forecasts issued increases, confirming that firms issue forecasts with 
different precision at different points in time. For example, for the 379 firms issuing two 
forecasts during the sample period, 45.9 percent (174 firms) issued forecasts with different 
precision. At the extreme (when 15 or more forecasts were issued), 55.9 percent of firms issued 
all three types of forecasts.  
 We next stratify the total sample of observations into either good news or bad news 
observations and test whether the sign of the news is related to the forecast precision. Following 
Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon (1998), Table 2, Panel B classifies as good 
(bad) news those observations with a forecast surprise variable (FS1) measured by cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) greater (less) than zero. CAR is measured as the summation of the 
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market-adjusted daily returns over the three-day window centered on the management forecast 
issue date, using standard market model procedures. Here, we find that managers are more likely 
to issue a range forecast regardless of the sign of news (good or bad), and that the preponderance 
of point forecasts is about the same across both good news and bad news (22.8 percent for good 
news and 21.4 percent for bad news). Similarly, the proportion of qualitative forecasts is 11.3 
percent for good news and 12.9 percent for bad news. 
 Next, we classify point and range forecasts by the sign of an alternative forecast surprise 
variable (FS2) in Table 2, Panel C. We measure FS2 as (management forecast – the most recent 
median analyst forecast) / stock price. Consistent with prior studies (Bamber and Cheon 1998; 
Baginski et al. 2004), we classify the observation as good news if FS2 is greater than or equal to 
zero, and classify the observation as bad news otherwise. When considering range forecasts, we 
use the midpoint of the range as the management forecast. Because no meaningful midpoint can 
be calculated from the qualitative forecasts, we focus only on point and range forecasts for this 
analysis. Accordingly, the number of observations falls from 16,872 in Panel B to 14,831 in 
Panel C. Once again, we find that managers are more likely to issue a range forecast, but the 
proportion differs depending on whether the forecast is good or bad news. Specifically, when the 
news is good, 28.7 percent of forecasts are point forecasts and 71.3 percent are range forecasts, 
but when the news is bad, only 18.7 percent of forecasts are point forecasts and 81.3 percent are 
range forecasts.  
We test whether the proportions based on forecast precision are independent of the sign 
of news. When we use the FS1 to classify news (in Panel B), the chi-square statistic for 
independence is 13.00 (p-value = 0.0015, df = 2), and when we use FS2 to classify news (in 
Panel C), the chi-square statistic for independence is 184.50 (p-value < 0.0001, df = 1). This 
 13
 
indicates that the difference in proportion for good versus bad news is significant, suggesting that 
the choice of precision is related to the sign of the news. However, the difference in the 
proportion is much more significant, both statistically and economically, for FS2 than for FS1.13  
We next perform multivariate analyses to confirm that this result holds when we control 
for other factors likely to affect management’s choice of forecast precision. 
Empirical Models 
 To examine hypotheses H1 and H2, we use the following equation, Eq. (1), which models 
the relationship between forecast precision, forecast surprise, and a set of control variables. 
PRECISION = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2)                           (1) 
                       + b3 BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 LN(NANAL) + b8 MB + b9 LN(SIZE) + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 
where:  
PRECISION = the precision of the management forecast, measured by either 
PRECISION1 or PRECISION2;  
 
PRECISION1 = 2 for point forecasts, 1 for range forecasts, and 0 for qualitative 
statements; 
 
PRECISION2 = 0 for point forecasts, and for range forecasts, is the negative of 
(the absolute value of [the upper limit minus the lower limit] 
deflated by the share price at day –2); 
 
FS1 = forecast surprise measured as the summation of market-adjusted 
returns over the three-day window centered on the forecast 
announcement date; 
 
FS2 = forecast surprise measured as the management forecast minus 
the most recent median analyst forecast preceding the 
management forecast, deflated by the share price at day –2; 
 
BAD_FS1 = 1 if FS1 < 0, and 0 otherwise; 
 
BAD_FS2 = 1 if FS2 < 0, and 0 otherwise; 
 
ABS_FS1 = the degree of forecast surprise, measured as the absolute value 
of FS1; 
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ABS_FS2 = the degree of forecast surprise, measured as the absolute value 
of FS2; 
 
HORIZON = the forecast horizon, measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of calendar days between forecast and end of the fiscal 
year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days;14 
 
SDRES = the standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over 
a 200-day period ending 31 trading days before the management 
forecast announcement; 
 
CON_OWN = concentrated ownership, defined as one minus the relative 
number of common shareholders to common shares outstanding 
( = 1 – [1000*(the number of common shareholders / the 
number of common shares outstanding)]); 
 
LN(NANAL)  = the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts 
following the firm during the month immediately preceding the 
management forecast; 
 
MB = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at 
the beginning of the fiscal year; 
 
LN(SIZE) = the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at 
the beginning of the fiscal year; 
 
CONC = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the 
sales of the top-five firms in the firm’s two-digit SIC code 
industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry 
during the year; 
 
YEAR = the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 
= 1996, … , 10 = 2004). 
 
We measure the precision of the forecasts using either PRECISION1 or PRECISION2. 
PRECISION1 is a discrete variable and tests using this dependent measure include all three 
forecast types (point, range, and qualitative), while PRECISION2 is a continuous variable and 
tests using this dependent measure include only point and range forecasts. All tests on 
PRECISION1 use an ordered logit model, while all tests on PRECISION2 use ordinary least 
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squares. The degree of the forecast surprise is measured by ABS_FS1 and by ABS_FS2,15 and the 
sign of the forecast surprise is measured by BAD_FS1 and BAD_FS2, respectively. If H1 is 
descriptive, so that forecast precision is lower the greater the forecast surprise, we expect the 
coefficient on ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2) to be negative. Similarly, if H2 is descriptive, so that the 
negative relation between forecast precision and forecast surprise is stronger for bad-news firms 
than for good-news firms, we expect the coefficient on BAD_FS1 * ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2 * 
ABS_FS2) to be negative. 
Among the control variables, we expect HORIZON to be negative because forecasts 
made later in the period should be subject to less earnings uncertainty (and thus, should be more 
precise). Because rapid changes in the business environment should make it difficult for 
managers to issue accurate, precise forecasts, and because managers’ beliefs should be more 
precise the lower the variability in expected economic earnings, we follow Baginski and Hassell 
(1997) and include SDRES, which we expect to be negative.16 We expect CON_OWN to be 
negative because monitoring and litigation concerns are likely to be higher when ownership is 
more concentrated (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007), leading managers to issue less-precise 
forecasts (Bamber and Cheon 1998). We use analyst following (LN(NANAL)) to proxy for 
private information production (Bhushan 1989) and/or the informativeness of firm disclosures 
(Lang and Lundholm 1996), and expect firms with greater analyst following to issue more-
precise forecasts. We expect growth potential (MB) to be positive because high-growth firms 
have stronger incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan 2002) and 
more-precise forecasts could be used to guide the market’s expectation downward to the beatable 
level.17 We expect firm size (LN(SIZE)) to be positive because larger firms provide more 
disclosure and their disclosure is of higher quality (Waymire 1986; Lang and Lundholm 1993, 
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1996; Botosan and Plumlee 2002), presumably because larger firms have stronger incentives to 
build reputations for good disclosure and could issue more precise forecasts in response (King 
1996). Alternatively, firm size could proxy for diversified operations, implying smoother and 
more predictable earnings, which could cause more-precise earnings forecasts as well as less 
forecast error. Finally, we expect firms with large proprietary costs related to concentrated 
product-markets (CONC) to issue less-precise forecasts (Bamber and Cheon 1998). We include 
YEAR to control for any time-series trend in forecast precision.18 We do not form expectations 
about the sign on this coefficient estimate because Bamber and Cheon (1998) document an 
increase in forecast precision over their (prior) sample period while, alternatively, increases in 
legal liability related to missed forecasts over time suggest a decrease in forecast precision over 
time.19 
To test hypotheses H3 and H4, we extend Eq. (1) as follows:20 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2)    (2) 
                       + b3 BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2) + b4 FERROR + b5 DNFE 
           + b6 DNFE* FERROR + b7 HORIZON + b8 SDRES + b9 CON_OWN  
                       + b10 LN(NANAL) + b11 MB + b12 LN(SIZE)   + b13 CONC + b14 YEAR + ε 
 
 
Eq. (2) adds three additional variables of interest ─ FERROR, DNFE and DNFE*FERROR ─ to 
Eq. (1). We use the ex post accuracy of the forecasts, FERROR (measured as the absolute value 
of the difference between the management forecast and the actual ex post earnings per share, 
deflated by stock price at day -2), to proxy for management’s forecast uncertainty about the 
eventual earnings realization. DNFE is an indicator variable set to 1 if the forecast error is 
negative (i.e., if the management forecast exceeds the actual ex post earnings per share), and 0 
otherwise. If H3 is descriptive, so that forecast precision is lower the greater the absolute forecast 
error, we expect the coefficient on FERROR to be negative. Similarly, if H4 is descriptive, so 
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that the negative relation between forecast precision and the absolute forecast error is stronger 
when forecast errors are negative than when they are positive, we expect the coefficient on 
DNFE * FERROR to be negative. 
In Table 3, we report descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analyses. The 
statistics are similar to those reported in prior studies.21  
Insert <Table 3>  
 Although not separately tabulated, we checked the correlations among variables used in 
the study. As expected, PRECISION1 and PRECISION2 are positively correlated (with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.3376, p < 0.001). The correlation between ABS_FS2 and FERROR is 
0.7531 (p < 0.001), but the correlation between ABS_FS1 and FERROR is relatively low (r = 
0.0832). Among the control variables, only the correlations between SDRES and LN(SIZE) (r =  
-0.4603) and between LN(NANAL) and LN(SIZE) (r = 0.7821) are greater than 0.3. In our 
regression analyses, no variance inflation factors exceed 3.75, confirming that multicollinearity 
is not a concern in our regression tests.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before testing our hypotheses, we first attempt to replicate the main findings in prior 
studies using our sample. Our study differs from prior studies that find weak evidence that 
managers tend to issue more (less) precise forecasts when news is good (bad) (e.g., Baginski and 
Hassell 1997; Bamber and Cheon 1998) in two important ways. First, our sample size is much 
larger, giving us greater power to detect a relation if one does, in fact, exist. Second, our sample 
is drawn from a more recent period where management’s concerns over litigation are likely to be 
 18
 
greater. Here, we use a simplified version of Eq. (1), similar to the model used in those studies 
and examine whether the coefficients on BAD_FS1 and/or BAD_FS2 are significantly negative: 
PRECISION1 = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 HORIZON + b3 SDRES + b4 CON_OWN      (3) 
                       + b5 LN(NANAL) + b6 MB + b7 LN(SIZE) + b8 CONC + b9 YEAR + ε 
 
Untabulated results on the indicator variables (BAD_FS1 and BAD_FS2) are consistent 
with the theory in Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon (1998). Specifically, we 
find that the coefficients on BAD_FS1 and BAD_FS2 are negative and statistically significant, 
revealing that managers do issue more (less) precise forecasts when news is good (bad). That is, 
bad-news forecasts are less precise while good-news forecasts are more precise. Our results on 
the other variables are generally consistent with prior studies and with expectations. Specifically, 
we find evidence suggesting that managers issue more precise forecasts when expected earnings 
variability (SDRES) is smaller and when their firms are followed by a larger number of analysts 
(LN(NANAL)). Furthermore, consistent with Bamber and Cheon (1998), we are unable to 
document the predicted association between forecast precision and growth opportunities (MB) or 
between forecast precision and ownership concentration (CON_OWN). Interestingly, the 
coefficient on LN(SIZE) (HORIZON) is not significant using the full sample, but is positive 
(negative) and significant when we restrict the sample to point and range forecasts. These results 
suggest that firm size is not related to management’s choice between issuing a qualitative 
statement, a range forecast, or a point forecast, but when only point and range forecasts are 
considered, large firms tend to release point forecasts more often than small firms. Similarly, 
forecast horizon is not related to management’s choice of forecast precision in the full sample, 
but managers tend to release less-precise forecasts the longer the forecast horizon when only 
point and range forecasts are considered.22 Contrary to results in Bamber and Cheon (1998), we 
find that forecast precision has declined over time (YEAR), but this could be because of our 
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different sample selection criteria and time periods23 and could be related to litigation resulting 
from missed forecasts in recent years (Wagner 2006). Finally, unlike Bamber and Cheon (1998), 
we do not find that firms in highly concentrated product markets (CONC) issue less-precise 
forecasts.  
 In Table 4, we test hypotheses H1 and H2, using Eq. (1). The coefficients on ABS_FS1 
and on ABS_FS2 test H1, and coefficients on BAD_FS1 * ABS_FS1 and on BAD_FS2 * 
ABS_FS2 test H2. We perform our analyses using a clustering procedure that accounts for serial 
dependence across years for a given firm. 
Insert <Table 4>  
 
We present the results from six models. The first two models include all forecasts and 
classify bad versus good news based on FS1. The next four models include only point and range 
forecasts and classify news based on FS1 (models 3 and 4) or on FS2 (models 5 and 6). We use 
this restricted sample because most management forecasts are either point or range forecasts and 
these forms are easier to interpret than qualitative statements. All models include the sign of the 
news and the magnitude of the forecast surprise, and three of the models (models 2, 4, and 6) 
interact these variables.24  
In all models, the coefficients on the forecast surprise (ABS_FS1 and ABS_FS2) are 
significantly negative, confirming that as forecast surprise increases, forecasts become more 
imprecise, consistent with H1. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction terms, BAD_FS1* 
ABS_FS1 and BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2 are significantly negative, revealing that the negative 
association between forecast precision and forecast surprise is stronger for bad news, consistent 
with H2. Finally, note that management forecasts are less precise, on average, when the earnings 
news is bad (i.e., the coefficients on BAD_FS1 and BAD_FS2 are negative). Results for the 
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control variables are largely consistent with those discussed previously in our replication of prior 
studies. 
In Table 5, we report the results using Eq. (1), restricting the sample to only point and 
range forecasts. Here, precision is a continuous variable where the value of PRECISION2 is 0 for 
a point forecast, negative and close to 0 for a narrow range forecast, and more negative for a 
wide range forecast; that is, it is the negative of the absolute value of the upper limit minus the 
lower limit deflated by the share price at day –2. Thus, PRECISION2 is not defined if we include 
qualitative statements. In essence, Table 5 replicates the analyses reported in Table 4 but 
considers the size of the range for range forecasts. 
Insert <Table 5>  
 
Again, we estimate various models, classifying good versus bad news using FS1 (models 
1 and 2) and FS2 (models 3 and 4), and we consider both the sign and the magnitude of the 
forecast surprise, as well as the interaction of the sign and magnitude. The results are consistent 
across Tables 4 and 5; as the magnitude of the forecast surprise increases, forecasts become less 
precise (i.e., the coefficients on ABS_FS1 and ABS_FS2 are significantly negative). This 
imprecision is manifested in management moving from making a point forecast, to a range 
forecast with a small range, and then to a range forecast with a large range as the forecast 
surprise increases. The results also indicate that this effect is more pronounced for bad-news 
forecasts than for good-news forecasts (i.e., the coefficients on the interaction variables, 
BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 and BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2, are significantly negative). 
Finally, in Table 6, we report the results from extending our analyses by focusing on 
point and range forecasts and including the realized (ex post) absolute forecast error. The results 
regarding H1 and H2 are consistent with those reported in Table 5. Specifically, forecast 
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precision is negatively associated with forecast surprise, and this effect is more pronounced for 
bad-news forecasts than for good-news forecasts. However, results on the absolute forecast error 
are mixed. When we use FS1 to classify the forecasts as good or bad news (i.e., in models 1 and 
2), the coefficient on the forecast error (FERROR) is significantly negative, consistent with 
management considering the magnitude of the forecast uncertainty when choosing the level of 
forecast precision, and making less-precise forecasts the larger the forecast error. In addition, this 
effect is more pronounced when the signed forecast error is negative, as evidenced by the 
significantly negative coefficient on DNFE*FERROR (in model 2). When we use FS2 to classify 
forecasts as good or bad news (i.e., in models 3 and 4), the coefficient on the forecast error is not 
significantly different from zero. However, for bad-news forecast errors, the coefficient on 
DNFE*FERROR is again significantly negative, and a joint test on DNFE*FERROR and 
FERROR reveals that bad-news forecasts are significantly less precise the larger the forecast 
error (F = 8.15, p = 0.004). Overall, these results suggest that management’s decision regarding 
forecast precision is related to both the forecast surprise and the forecast error, especially when 
the signed forecast error is negative. These findings are consistent with H3 and, in the case of 
negative forecast errors, H4. 
Insert <Table 6>  
 
 The insignificant coefficients on FERROR reported in models 3 and 4 of Table 6 could be 
because of the high correlation (r = 0.7531) between absolute forecast error (FERROR) and 
forecast surprise (ABS_FS2).25 To check whether the insignificant coefficients on FERROR are 
attributable to this high correlation, we use Eq. (4), which can be viewed as a shortened version 
of Eq. (2) that does not contain any variables related to forecast surprise and re-perform the 
analyses. 
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PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 FERROR + b2 DNFE + b3 DNFE* FERROR + b4 HORIZON             (4) 
+ b5 SDRES + b6 CON_OWN + b7 LN(NANAL) + b8 MB + b9 LN(SIZE)  
+ b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 
The results from estimating Eq. (4) are reported in model 5. Both b1 and b3 are highly 
significant. Specifically, the coefficient on FERROR is -1.878 (p < 0.001) and that on 
DNFE*FERROR is -8.028 (p < 0.001), consistent with H3 and H4, respectively.  
 In Table 2, Panel A, we note substantial changes in forecast properties from the pre-Reg 
FD period to the post-Reg FD period. Specifically, our results show that the number of forecasts 
increased and the forecast precision decreased, consistent with prior findings (Heflin et al. 2003; 
Ajinkya et al. 2005).26 As a robustness check that controls for structural changes around the 
issuance of Reg FD, we replace the YEAR variable in Eqs. (1) and (2) with a Reg FD indicator 
variable that is set to 1 if the forecast is issued in the post-Reg FD period (i.e., after October 
2000), and 0 otherwise. Our results (not tabulated) show that the coefficients on this indicator 
variable in all models are negative and significant at the 1 percent level, consistent with findings 
in Ajinkya et al. (2005) and with their argument that after Reg FD, firms issued forecasts with 
less precision (thus reducing the cost of disclosure). More importantly, however, our empirical 
findings on H1 through H4 are unchanged by the addition of the Reg FD indicator variable. That 
is, in all models, we continue to find that forecast precision is negatively associated with the 
magnitudes of forecast surprise and absolute forecast error, and that the negative association is 
stronger for bad-news forecasts and for forecasts with negative forecast errors.  
To further examine whether our main results differ between the Pre- and the Post-Reg FD 
periods, we also interacted the Reg FD indicator variable and the variables of interest (i.e., 
ABS_FS1, BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1, FERROR, DNFE*FERROR) and added these and the Reg FD 
indicator variable to Eqs. (1) and (2). The coefficients on the interactions are generally 
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insignificant, suggesting that the associations reported did not change between the Pre- and Post-
Reg FD periods.27  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study, we reexamine whether the sign of the news (good versus bad) is associated 
with the precision of management earnings forecasts (i.e., point, range, or qualitative forecasts). 
Prior studies hypothesize such an association, but the evidence is mixed. Using a larger sample 
of more recent forecasts than used in these prior studies, we provide strong evidence that bad-
news forecasts are less precise than are good-news forecasts. We also show that the precision of 
range forecasts is related to the sign of the news and to the magnitude of the forecast surprise 
(i.e., the difference between the management earnings forecast and the market’s extant 
expectations for future earnings). Specifically, forecasts become less precise and ranges (for 
range forecasts) become larger the greater the forecast surprise, and the relationship is stronger 
for bad-news forecasts than for good-news forecasts. Furthermore, we find evidence consistent 
with management considering forecast uncertainty (measured by the absolute difference between 
the management earnings forecast and management’s expectations for future earnings) when 
choosing the level of forecast precision, even after controlling for the sign and magnitude of the 
forecast surprise. In addition, we find that the relationship between forecast precision and 
forecast uncertainty is stronger when the management forecast exceeds ex post earnings (so that 
the realized forecast error is negative). We posit that this could result from management’s 
litigation concerns.  
In sum, the findings in our study are consistent with management acting strategically 
when choosing forecast precision. In developing policies to encourage managers to issue 
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earnings guidance, it is important for policy makers to consider this strategic behavior. For 
example, over the last ten years, we observe a significant shift away from point forecasts, toward 
range forecasts. Because the precision of range forecasts also varies with the sign of the news, 
the magnitude of the forecast surprise, and the magnitude of the absolute forecast error, we posit 
that precision may have deteriorated and the “quality” of information may have declined even 
though more management forecasts are issued. Thus, further research to understand the factors 
affecting management’s choice of forecast precision should be an important input to disclosure 
regulation. 
 This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, management’s choice of forecast 
precision may be influenced by omitted factors. Although our models include various control 
variables, our proxies may not be sufficient to fully control for other omitted latent variables. 
Second, managers have the ability to use forecast precision and other forecast characteristics 
simultaneously. Although we control for forecast timing (HORIZON) in our analyses, other 
factors such as forecast venue and the announcement of supplementary information (see Hutton 
et al. 2003 among others) are beyond the scope of this study and are not considered here. Finally, 
managers may intentionally issue biased forecasts to influence the market’s perception. We 
consider the forecast bias in our empirical analyses only in a limited sense, because we believe 
that the bias would have a second-order impact (if any) on the precision of the forecasts. Future 
research on the interaction between the choice of precision and other factors is warranted.    
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Endnotes 
1. Management forecasts of earnings are voluntary disclosures so managers have significant 
discretion in terms of the forecast precision, the timing of their forecasts, the time horizon of 
forecasts (e.g., quarterly or annual), the level of forecast disaggregation, and a number of other 
attributes such as the provision of supplementary information.  
2. These consequences include, but are not limited to, effects on stock prices (Pownall et al. 
1993), analyst forecasts (Baginski and Hassell 1990), the cost of capital (Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Healey and Palepu 2001; Botosan and Plumlee 2002), and bid-ask spread (Coller and 
Yohn 1997). 
3. For example, Baginski and Hassell (1997) use the sign of the stock price reaction measured 
over the three days surrounding the management forecast to classify the news as good or bad, 
and find no significant association between the sign of the stock price reaction and forecast 
precision. Alternatively, Bamber and Cheon (1998) characterize good versus bad news based on 
whether the management forecast exceeds extant analyst forecasts and on the sign of the stock 
price reaction to the management forecast. They find weak evidence that bad news forecasts are 
less precise, but this result is not significant when they control for the multiple observations per 
sample firm. The exception is Skinner (1994) who studies 374 disclosures made by 93 NASDAQ 
firms between 1981 and 1990, and finds that good-news disclosures are more precise than bad-
news disclosures. 
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4. Here, forecasted earnings proxies for management’s rational expectation for future earnings. A 
larger forecast error implies that management had greater difficulty in forecasting earnings, 
suggesting that managers faced greater uncertainty at the time of the forecast issuance.  
5. Negative (positive) signed forecast errors occur when forecasts exceed (fall short of) the actual 
ex post earnings. In other words, negative (positive) forecast errors occur when forecasts are 
optimistic (pessimistic). 
6. Graham et al. (2005) find that more than 46 percent of managers surveyed agree with the 
litigation cost hypothesis – that firms can avoid potential lawsuits when actual earnings 
outcomes do not match forward-looking disclosures by limiting these disclosures. Alternatively, 
Baginski et al. (2002) report that U.S. firms tend to release more imprecise, short-term forecasts 
and more bad-news forecasts, while Canadian firms release more-precise, long-term forecasts 
and more good-news forecasts. They explain that their findings are consistent with higher 
potential legal liability costs of U.S. firms versus Canadian firms. 
7. Alternatively, managers could choose to overstate the magnitude of bad news in their earnings 
forecasts (which would create a positive earnings surprise at the earnings announcement) in an 
attempt to manage litigation risk. However, this strategy would induce excessive stock price 
volatility (because of the initial excessive stock price decrease at the time of the forecast issuance 
and the successive stock price increase at the time of the earnings announcement), and managers 
are still responsible for making overly pessimistic disclosures. Although we do not formally test 
whether managers manage litigation risk by issuing biased forecasts, we do perform separate 
analyses on positive and negative signed forecast errors (i.e., forecast bias) to determine whether 
their association with forecast precision differs. 
 30
 
8. Note, however, that Pownall et al. (1993) do not find a stronger market reaction to more 
precise management forecasts.  
9. We eliminated these observations rather than attempting to control for the confounding effect 
statistically, because when forecasts for multiple fiscal periods are made on the same date, we 
cannot determine the amount of the forecast surprise that is related to each of the forecasts.  
10. For a discussion of the benefits of using the First Call actual EPS, see footnote 15 in Ajinkya 
et al. (2005). 
11. The cutoff of 110 days is based on Baginski and Hassell (1997), where forecasts made more 
than 110 days after period-end (but before the earnings release) are deleted from their sample of 
922 annual management forecasts. Removing this restriction does not materially affect our 
results.  
12. Among our 16,872 sample observations, 803 observations are issued after fiscal year-end 
(but within 110 calendar days from the fiscal year-end). Our results are robust to the exclusion of 
these preannouncement observations. 
13. Note that our test results are generally stronger when we measure the forecast surprise based 
on the FS2 rather than FS1. We suggest that using analyst forecasts allows us to form a cleaner 
proxy for the magnitude of the news in the forecast because stock market returns likely reflect 
other confounding factors.  
14. We add 111 to avoid taking the logarithm of a negative number. See endnote 20 for further 
details. 
15. To measure the magnitude of the surprise, we also use the rank of the variable rather than the 
continuous variable. Because the results are not qualitatively different, we do not separately 
report results using the rank. 
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16. In untabulated analyses, we also use the dispersion of analyst forecasts (DISP) to control for 
earnings variability, where we require at least four analyst forecasts (Behn et al. 2008). The 
Pearson correlation between DISP and FERROR (n = 11,153) is not very high (r = 0.1462, p < 
0.001), suggesting that the variables capture different information, presumably because the 
information available to analysts and management differs. While our results are robust to this 
alternative measure, we tabulate the results using SDRES because this measure is used in related 
studies (e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1997) and because the use of DISP requires that sample 
observations have a minimum number of analysts following, skewing our sample composition 
toward very large firms. 
17. In contrast, Bamber and Cheon (1998) expect a negative sign on growth potential because 
growth firms may have larger proprietary costs. However, Bamber and Cheon (1998) fail to find 
a significant relationship between forecast precision and growth. 
18. As defined below Eq. (1), for the comparability with Bamber and Cheon (1998, 178), YEAR 
is a discrete year variable rather than a series of dummy variables for individual years. 
Sensitivity analysis using separate dummy variables for each year yields qualitatively identical 
inferences. 
19. According to Wagner (2006, 22), “navigating the Securities and Exchange Commission rules 
regarding guidance can be tricky. And companies have seen millions worth of market 
capitalization vaporize when performance didn't exactly match predictions. So, rather than 
hazard a stock sell-off—not to mention the occasional spurious class action—after missing their 
earnings per share estimate by even a penny, corporate leaders are more often deciding to give 
investors actual business news rather than magic numbers.” 
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20. Here, we measure forecast precision using PRECISION2 because FERROR is measureable 
only when forecasts are point estimates or ranges.  
21. The DAYSPRIOR variable in Table 3 is the unlogged value of the number of calendar days 
from the management forecast date to fiscal year-end. When the variable is converted to the 
logged value, and relabelled HORIZON, for our multivariate analyses (as reported in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6), we add 111 days (following prior literature) because some forecasts are made as late as 
110 days after fiscal year-end (but before the earnings announcement date). For example, if a 
forecast is made on January 10 (10 days after the end of the fiscal year), the variable is converted 
to log(-10 + 111) = log(101). As a robustness check, we re-perform all of the analyses after 
removing 792 observations where the forecast was released after fiscal year-end (but before the 
earnings announcement). The results are qualitatively similar and all inferences remain the same. 
22. When the dependent variable is defined as PRECISION2 in subsequent analyses (as reported 
in Tables 5 and 6), we still find that the coefficient on LN(SIZE) (HORIZON) is significantly 
positive (negative). These results, combined with those above, indicate that larger firms (firms 
with a shorter forecast horizon) tend to release point forecasts or forecasts with narrower ranges 
rather than wider ranges when only point and range forecasts are considered.  
23. Specifically, Bamber and Cheon (1998) study an earlier time period (1981 through 1991) and 
require that sample firms have at least eight years of analyst disclosure ratings available from the 
Association for Investment Management and Research over the period 1981 through 1991. 
Because of this, we expect that their sample firms are likely larger than ours, on average. 
24. In additional analyses, rather than combining the good and bad news subsamples, we divided 
the samples and perform regressions with good and bad news subsamples separately. All the 
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results are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 4, 5, and 6, so we do not tabulate these results. 
These results can be obtained from the authors on request. 
25. Recall that the coefficients on FERROR are significant (in models 1 and 2) when we use 
ABS_FS1 rather than ABS_FS2, and that the correlation between FERROR and ABS_FS1 is not 
high (0.0832). 
26. Interestingly, Bushee et al. (2004) find that managers were significantly less likely to hold 
conference calls following the implementation of Reg FD. Thus, it may be that managers 
substituted earnings forecasts for conference calls, but that the overall quality of information did 
not increase during the post-Reg FD period. 
27. For example, the coefficients on FD, FD*ABS_FS1, and FD*BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 are -0.741 
(p < 0.001), 0.043 (p = 0.191), and -0.175 (p = 0.325) respectively when FD and the interaction 
variables are added to Model 2 in Table 5. The coefficients on FD, FD*FERROR, and 
FD*DNFE*FERROR are -0.146 (p < 0.001), -0.116 (p = 0.235), and -1.036 (p = 0.197) 
respectively when FD the interaction variables are added to Model 5, Table 6. Because 
management concerns about legal liability may have been magnified after the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), we also examine whether there are structural changes in our 
main results by including a post-SOX indicator variable and interactions between this indicator 
and our variables of interest into Eqs. (1) and (2). Untabulated analyses reveal that the 
coefficients on these interaction variables are insignificant, while the coefficient on SOX is 
significantly negative. This is similar to the results using our post-Reg FD variable. These results 
suggest that while management forecast precision is lower, all else equal, in the post-SOX 
period, our main results were not significantly altered with the passage of SOX. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
  
Management forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) from the First Call 
database from 1995 through 2004  27,841 
  
(-) Observations with forecasts for more than one period  (5,764) 
  
(-) Forecasts missing a preceding consensus analyst forecast or corresponding  
     actual earnings in First Call (3,053) 
  
(-) Forecasts made more than 110 days after the fiscal-year end  (56) 
  
(-) Forecasts missing COMPUSTAT data (1,582) 
  
(-) Forecasts missing CRSP data (514) 
  
Number of management forecasts in the final sample 16,872 
  
Number of firms in final sample 2,735 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distributions 
 
Panel A: Precision of Management Forecasts by Forecast Year - Number and (Percentage)  
 
 Point Range Qualitative Total 
1995 116 (49.4) 
99 
(42.1) 
20 
(8.5) 
235 
(100.0) 
1996 131 (42.3) 
127 
(41.0) 
52 
(16.8) 
310 
(100.0) 
1997 222 (46.6) 
143 
(30.0) 
111 
(23.3) 
476 
(100.0) 
1998 371 (44.5) 
247 
(29.7) 
215 
(25.8) 
833 
(100.0) 
1999 340 (32.8) 
324 
(31.2) 
374 
(36.0) 
1,038 
(100.0) 
2000 382 (35.0) 
442 
(39.3) 
300 
(26.7) 
1,124 
(100.0) 
2001 547 (22.5) 
1,605 
(66.1) 
276 
(11.4) 
2,428 
(100.0) 
2002 618 (20.0) 
2,250 
(72.8) 
223 
(7.2) 
3,091 
(100.0) 
2003 535 (15.8) 
2,624 
(77.4) 
232 
(6.8) 
3,391 
(100.0) 
2004 462 (11.7) 
3,246 
(82.3) 
238 
(6.0) 
3,946 
(100.0) 
Total 3,724 (22.1) 
11,107 
(65.8) 
2,041 
(12.1) 
16,872 
(100.0) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Precision of Management Forecast by the Sign of News (Good or Bad) Where the 
Sign is Measured Based on the Sign of FS1 - Frequency and (Percentage)  
 
Forecast Type Point Range Qualitative Total 
Good News  1,903 (22.8) 5,509 (65.9) 942 (11.3) 8,354 (100.0) 
Bad News  1,821 (21.4)  
5,598 (65.7) 
 
1,099 (12.9) 
 
8,518 (100.0) 
 
Total  3,724 (22.1) 11,107 (65.8) 2,041 (12.1) 16,872 (100.0) 
 
Note: We classify forecasts as good news if FS1 (which is measured using cumulative abnormal returns) > 0, and as 
bad news if FS1< 0. 
 
 
Panel C: Precision of Management Forecast by the Sign of News (Good or Bad) Where the 
Sign is Measured Based on the Sign of FS2 - Frequency and (Percentage)  
 
Forecast Type Point Range Total 
Good News   2,727 (28.7) 6,762 (71.3)  9,489 (100.0) 
Bad News     997 (18.7) 4,345 (81.3) 5,342 (100.0) 
Total  3,724 (25.1) 11,107 (74.9) 14,831 (100.0) 
 
Note: We classify forecasts as good news if FS2 (which is measured as [(management forecast - median analyst 
forecast) / stock price] ≥ 0, and as bad news if FS2 < 0.  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
FS1 16,872 -0.0095 0.1045 -0.1875 -0.0001 0.1280 
ABS_FS1 16,872  0.0656 0.0819 0.0031 0.0391 0.2162 
BAD_FS1 16,872  0.5049 0.5000 0 1 1 
FS2 14,831  0.0180 0.0642 -0.0171 0.0004 0.1060 
ABS_FS2 14,831  0.0254 0.0617 0 0.0031 0.1123 
BAD_FS2 14,831  0.3602 0.4801 0 0 1 
FERROR 14,831  0.0325 0.0736 0.0002 0.0081 0.1283 
DNFE 14,831  0.5443 0.4981 0 1 1 
DAYSPRIOR 16,872  204.0 195.5 4.0 210.0 377.0 
SDRES 16,872  0.0271 0.0141 0.0107 0.0239 0.0541 
CON_OWN 16,872  0.8103 0.4183 0.3522 0.9222 0.9957 
NANAL 16,872  8.623 6.587 1.000 7.000 22.000 
MB 16,872  3.115 11.689 0.719 2.329 10.031 
SIZE 16,872  8,245 29,293 77 1,132 33,267 
CONC 16,872  0.422 0.168 0.185 0.384 0.746 
Notes:  
FS1  = forecast surprise measured as the summation of market-adjusted daily returns over the three-day  
  window centered on the management forecast date using standard market model procedures  
(CAR); 
ABS_FS1    = the degree of forecast surprise, measured as the absolute value of FS1; 
BAD_FS1   = an indicator variable which equals one if FS1 < 0 and zero if FS1 > 0; 
FS2       = forecast surprise measured as the management forecast minus the most recent median analyst  
forecast preceding the management forecast, deflated by stock price at day -2; 
ABS_FS2      = the degree of forecast surprise, measured as the absolute value of FS2; 
BAD_FS2    = an indicator variable which equals one if FS2 < 0 and zero if FS2 ≥ 0; 
FERROR     = unsigned forecast error measured by the absolute value of (the actual earnings per share minus 
management forecast, deflated by stock price at day -2); 
DNFE     = an indicator variable that equals one if the signed forecast error is negative (i.e., management 
forecast exceeds the actual earnings per share) and zero otherwise; 
DAYSPRIOR  = the number of calendar days between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the 
forecast pertains; 
SDRES       = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                trading days before the management forecast; 
CON_OWN  = concentrated ownership defined as one minus the relative number of common shareholders to 
common shares outstanding ( = 1 – [1000*(the number of common shareholders / the number of 
common shares outstanding)]); 
NANAL = the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately preceding the 
management forecast; 
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MB = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year; 
SIZE       = the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC      = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  
                        the two digit SIC industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry during the year. 
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Table 4 
The Association between Forecast Precision and the Magnitude of Forecast Surprise 
Considering Good versus Bad News 
 
PRECISION1 = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2)  
                       + b3 BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 LN(NANAL) + b8 MB + b9 LN(SIZE) + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 
All Forecasts Point and Range Forecasts Only 
Variable Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
BAD_FS1 (-) -0.100 (0.001)*** 
-0.013 
(0.328) 
-0.112 
(0.003)*** 
 0.006 
(0.548)       -       - 
BAD_FS2 (-)       -       -       -      - -0.654 (0.000)*** 
-0.657 
(0.000)*** 
ABS_FS1 (-) -1.191 (0.000)*** 
-0.209 
(0.063)* 
-1.236 
(0.000)*** 
-0.017 
(0.037)**       -       - 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -       -       -       - -1.424 (0.002)*** 
-1.445 
(0.007)*** 
BAD_FS1 * 
ABS_FS1 (-)       - 
-1.432 
(0.001)***       - 
-1.898 
(0.000)***       -       - 
BAD_FS2 * 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -       -       -       -       - 
-0.243 
(0.045)** 
HORIZON (-)  0.016 (0.648) 
 0.014 
(0.629) 
-0.124 
(0.008)*** 
-0.126 
(0.007)*** 
-0.131 
(0.006)*** 
-0.131 
(0.006)*** 
SDRES (-) -1.353 (0.255) 
-1.714 
(0.202) 
 10.071 
(0.937) 
 9.639 
(0.921) 
 8.797 
(0.920) 
 8.769 
(0.913) 
CON_OWN (-)  0.060 (0.741) 
 0.061 
(0.742) 
 -0.010 
(0.459) 
-0.009 
(0.463) 
-0.002 
(0.491) 
-0.002 
(0.492) 
LN(NANAL) (+)  0.123 (0.003)*** 
 0.125 
(0.003)*** 
 0.045 
(0.246) 
 0.047 
(0.233) 
 0.020 
(0.381) 
 0.020 
(0.379) 
MB (+) -0.003 (0.842) 
-0.003 
(0.155) 
-0.002 
(0.242) 
-0.003 
(0.238) 
-0.003 
(0.194) 
-0.003 
(0.194) 
LN(SIZE) (+) -0.012 (0.684) 
-0.012 
(0.681) 
 0.108 
(0.001)*** 
 0.108 
(0.001)*** 
 0.113 
(0.001)*** 
 0.113 
(0.001)*** 
CONC (-)  0.064 (0.686) 
 0.063 
(0.685) 
 0.118 
(0.722) 
 0.120 
(0.725) 
 0.153 
(0.773) 
-0.153 
(0.227) 
YEAR (?) -0.094 (0.000)*** 
-0.095 
(0.000)*** 
-0.331 
(0.000)*** 
-0.333 
(0.000)*** 
-0.338 
(0.000)*** 
-0.338 
(0.000)*** 
N   16,872 16,872 14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 
Log-
likelihood 
Ratio  
(Chi-square) 
 214.67 (0.000)*** 
225.93 
(0.000)*** 
1572.07 
(0.000)*** 
1585.04 
(0.000)*** 
1760.85 
(0.000)***  
1760.89 
(0.000)*** 
Pseudo R2   0.015  0.016  0.149   0.150   0.166  0.166 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
Notes:  
Models 1and 2 are the ordered-response logit analysis of the management forecast precision, where the dependent 
variable, PRECISION1 is set to 2 for point forecasts, 1 for range forecasts, and 0 for qualitative forecasts. Models 3, 
4, 5 and 6 are the binary logit analysis of the management forecast precision which equals one for point forecasts, 
and zero for range forecasts. A positive coefficient in all models is associated with more precise (i.e., specific) 
forecasts. Intercepts are not tabulated for parsimony. 
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004). Please refer to 
Table 3 for the definitions of other variables. 
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity 
and a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm. One-tailed p-values are 
presented in the parentheses when a directional prediction is made. Otherwise, p-values are two-tailed. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5 
The Association between a Continuous Measure of Forecast Precision and the Magnitude 
of Forecast Surprise Considering Good versus Bad News 
 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2)  
                       + b3 BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 LN(NANAL) + b8 MB + b9 LN(SIZE) + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 
 
Variable Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept (?)  0.496 (0.000)*** 
 0.502 
(0.000)*** 
 0.751 
(0.000)*** 
 0.768 
(0.000)*** 
BAD_FS1 (-) -0.015 (0.118) 
-0.008 
(0.319)      -      - 
BAD_FS2 (-)       -      - -0.075 (0.000)*** 
-0.028 
(0.033)** 
ABS_FS1 (-) -0.237 (0.013)** 
-0.183 
(0.037)**      -      - 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -      - -3.549 (0.000)*** 
-3.056 
(0.000)*** 
BAD_FS1 * 
ABS_FS1 (-)       - 
-0.176 
(0.036)**      -      - 
BAD_FS2 * 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -      -      - 
-3.621 
(0.004)*** 
  HORIZON (-) -0.166 (0.000)*** 
-0.165 
(0.000)*** 
-0.160 
(0.000)*** 
-0.168 
(0.000)*** 
  SDRES (-) -6.008 (0.000)*** 
-5.921 
(0.000)*** 
-6.282 
(0.000)*** 
-5.720 
(0.000)*** 
  CON_OWN (-)  0.010 (0.717) 
 0.010 
(0.714) 
 0.014 
(0.809) 
 0.013 
(0.788) 
  LN(NANAL) (+)  0.061 (0.000)*** 
 0.060 
(0.000)*** 
 0.066 
(0.000)*** 
 0.061 
(0.000)*** 
  MB (+)  0.001 (0.021)** 
 0.001 
(0.021)** 
 0.001 
(0.044)** 
 0.001 
(0.046)** 
  LN(SIZE) (+)  0.043 (0.000)*** 
 0.043 
(0.000)*** 
 0.033 
(0.000)*** 
 0.033 
(0.000)*** 
  CONC (-)  0.015 (0.597) 
 0.015 
(0.596) 
 0.062 
(0.856) 
 0.057 
(0.838) 
  YEAR (?) -0.030 (0.000)*** 
-0.030 
(0.000)*** 
-0.047 
(0.000)*** 
-0.047 
(0.000)*** 
  N  14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 
  F-value  126.39 (0.000)*** 
115.54 
(0.000)*** 
298.61 
(0.000)*** 
294.03 
(0.000)*** 
  R2    0.079  0.079  0.168  0.179 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable, PRECISION2, is set to 0 for point forecasts, and for range forecasts is the negative of (the 
absolute value of [the upper limit minus the lower limit] deflated by the share price at day –2). A positive coefficient 
is associated with more precise forecasts. All models are estimated by OLS and all coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for presentation purposes.  
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004) and DNFE    is an 
indicator variable which equals one if signed management forecast error is negative and zero otherwise. Please refer 
to Table 3 for the definitions of other variables. 
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity 
and a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm. One-tailed p-values are 
presented in the parentheses when a directional prediction is made. Otherwise, p-values are two-tailed. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 
The Association between a Continuous Measure of Forecast Precision and Forecast 
Surprise and Forecast Error, Considering Good versus Bad News 
 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_FS1 (or BAD_FS2) + b2 ABS_FS1 (or ABS_FS2)  
                       + b3 BAD_FS1*ABS_FS1 (or BAD_FS2*ABS_FS2) + b4 FERROR + b5 DNFE  
                       + b6 DNFE* FERROR + b7 HORIZON + b8 SDRES + b9 CON_OWN + b10 LN(NANAL)  
                       + b11 MB + b12 LN(SIZE) + b13 CONC + b14 YEAR + ε 
 
 
Variable Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept (?)  0.495 (0.000)*** 
 0.366 
(0.000)*** 
 0.748 
(0.000)*** 
 0.621 
(0.000)*** 
 0.357 
(0.000)*** 
BAD_FS1 (-) -0.001 (0.493) 
-0.001 
(0.472)      -      - - 
BAD_FS2 (-)       -       - -0.026 (0.087)* 
-0.048 
(0.021)** - 
ABS_FS1 (-) -0.191 (0.040)** 
-0.196 
(0.044)**      -      - - 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -       - -2.715 (0.000)*** 
 -2.719 
(0.000)*** - 
BAD_FS1 * 
ABS_FS1 (-) 
-0.056 
(0.067)* 
-0.016 
(0.070)*      -    - - 
BAD_FS2 * 
ABS_FS2 (-)       -       - 
-3.738 
(0.004) *** 
 -1.564 
(0.032)** - 
  FERROR (-) -2.221 (0.000)*** 
-1.868 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.037 
 (0.117) 
 -0.023 
(0.298) 
-1.878 
(0.000)*** 
  DNFE (?) - -0.140 (0.015)*** - 
 -0.104 
  (0.003)*** 
-0.139 
(0.001)*** 
  DNFE*  
  FERROR (-) - 
-8.027 
(0.001)*** - 
 -5.056 
  (0.004)*** 
-8.028 
(0.001)*** 
  HORIZON (-) -0.130 (0.000)*** 
-0.113 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.163 
(0.000)*** 
  0.144 
(0.000)*** 
-0.124 
(0.000)*** 
  SDRES (-) -5.430 (0.000)*** 
-4.337 
(0.001)*** 
 -5.590 
(0.000)*** 
 -5.105 
(0.000)*** 
-4.620 
(0.000)*** 
  CON_OWN (-)  0.009 (0.715) 
 0.005 
(0.603) 
  0.013 
(0.781) 
  0.009 
(0.713) 
 0.004 
(0.596) 
  NANAL (+)  0.064 (0.000)*** 
 0.053 
(0.000)*** 
  0.061 
(0.000)*** 
  0.055 
(0.000)*** 
 0.053 
(0.000)*** 
  MB (+)  0.001 (0.035)** 
 0.001 
(0.046)** 
  0.001 
(0.047)** 
  0.001 
(0.071)* 
 0.001 
(0.071)* 
  LN(SIZE) (+)  0.033 (0.000)*** 
 0.034 
(0.000)*** 
  0.033 
(0.000)*** 
  0.033 
(0.000)*** 
 0.034 
(0.000)*** 
  CONC (-)  0.050 (0.802) 
 0.049 
(0.816) 
  0.059 
(0.845) 
  0.059 
(0.849) 
 0.048 
(0.801) 
  YEAR (?) -0.042 (0.000)*** 
-0.043 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.049 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.047 
(0.000)*** 
-0.042 
(0.000)*** 
  N  14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 
  F-value  183.86 (0.000)*** 
207.37 
(0.000)*** 
270.62 
(0.000)*** 
252.89 
(0.000)*** 
203.53 
(0.000)*** 
  R2    0.130  0.164  0.180  0.193   0.159 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable, PRECISION2, is set to 0 for point forecasts, and for range forecasts is the negative of (the 
absolute value of [the upper limit minus the lower limit] deflated by the share price at day –2). A positive coefficient 
is associated with more precise forecasts. All models are estimated by OLS and all coefficients are multiplied by 100 
for presentation purposes.  
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004). Please refer to 
Table 3 for the definitions of other variables. 
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity 
and a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm. One-tailed p-values are 
presented in the parentheses when a directional prediction is made. Otherwise, p-values are two-tailed. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
